TY - GEN
T1 - Cooperative spectrum and infrastructure leasing on TV bands
AU - Xing, Xiaoshuang
AU - Liu, Hang
AU - Cheng, Xiuzhen
AU - Zhou, Wei
AU - Chen, Dechang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - In this paper, we propose a cooperative wireless infrastructure and spectrum leasing framework for sharing unused TV spectrum, in which the ownership of network infrastructure and spectrum is decoupled, and each can be leased and delivered as a service on demand. An incumbent TV spectrum owner (TSO) can lease a share of the infrastructure from a network infrastructure owner (NIO) with a payper- use model, to provide new services to its end users. On the other hand, the TSO can rent a portion of its unused spectrum to the NIO for revenue such that the NIO can obtain access to the TV spectrum to serve the NIO’s customers. This proposed framework creates a win-win situation by allowing TSO and NIO to lease spectrum and infrastructure from each other for providing services and earning profits.We analyze the interplay between the spectrum owner (TSO) and infrastructure owner (NIO) by formulating a multi-stage Stackelberg game, where TSO and NIO determine the infrastructure leasing price, the amount of infrastructure to lease, the spectrum leasing price, and the amount of spectrum to lease sequentially to maximize their utilities. The best strategies that will be taken by TSO and NIO under different situations are obtained through backward induction. The formed cooperative structure, the network throughput, and the two entities’ utilities are theoretically analyzed when TSO has different levels of idle bandwidth supply.
AB - In this paper, we propose a cooperative wireless infrastructure and spectrum leasing framework for sharing unused TV spectrum, in which the ownership of network infrastructure and spectrum is decoupled, and each can be leased and delivered as a service on demand. An incumbent TV spectrum owner (TSO) can lease a share of the infrastructure from a network infrastructure owner (NIO) with a payper- use model, to provide new services to its end users. On the other hand, the TSO can rent a portion of its unused spectrum to the NIO for revenue such that the NIO can obtain access to the TV spectrum to serve the NIO’s customers. This proposed framework creates a win-win situation by allowing TSO and NIO to lease spectrum and infrastructure from each other for providing services and earning profits.We analyze the interplay between the spectrum owner (TSO) and infrastructure owner (NIO) by formulating a multi-stage Stackelberg game, where TSO and NIO determine the infrastructure leasing price, the amount of infrastructure to lease, the spectrum leasing price, and the amount of spectrum to lease sequentially to maximize their utilities. The best strategies that will be taken by TSO and NIO under different situations are obtained through backward induction. The formed cooperative structure, the network throughput, and the two entities’ utilities are theoretically analyzed when TSO has different levels of idle bandwidth supply.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84943622322&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-21837-3_61
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-21837-3_61
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84943622322
SN - 9783319218366
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 623
EP - 633
BT - Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications - 10th International Conference, WASA 2015, Proceedings
A2 - Xu, Kuai
A2 - Zhu, Haojin
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 10th International Conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications, WASA 2015
Y2 - 10 August 2015 through 12 August 2015
ER -