TY - JOUR
T1 - Game theoretic analysis of green spectrum and infrastructure leasing on TV bands
AU - Xing, Xiaoshuang
AU - Chen, Biao
AU - Liu, Hang
AU - Cheng, Xiuzhen
AU - Zhou, Wei
AU - Chen, Dechang
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received May 11, 2016; revised August 30, 2016; accepted November 28, 2016. Date of publication December 7, 2016; date of current version July 14, 2017. This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61602062), in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BK20160410), in part by the Provincial Key Laboratory for Computer Information Processing Technology, in part by the Soochow University under Grant KJS1521 and Grant KJS1522, in part by the General Project of University Natural Science Research of Jiangsu Province (No. 16KJD520001), and in part by the National Science Foundation of the US (AST-1443858, AST-1443773, AST-1443916, ECCS-1407986, CNS-1265311, and CNS-1162057). The review of this paper was coordinated by Dr. Y. Song.
Publisher Copyright:
© 1967-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2017/7
Y1 - 2017/7
N2 - In this paper, we propose a green spectrum and infrastructure leasing framework for sharing unused TV spectrum, in which the ownership of the network infrastructure and spectrum are decoupled, and each can be leased as a service on demand. An incumbent TV spectrum owner (TSO) can lease a share of the infrastructure from a network infrastructure owner (NIO) with a pay-per-use model, to provide new services to its end users. On the other hand, a TSO can rent a portion of its unused spectrum to the NIO for revenue such that the NIO can obtain access to the spectrum to serve its customers. This proposed framework achieves green communications through both resource sharing and energy saving. Our paper aims to analyze the interplay between TSO and NIO, and create a win-win situation to provide sufficient incentives for them to cooperate on this green communications. A multistage Stackelberg game is formulated, where TSO and NIO sequentially determine the total bandwidth supply for sharing, the infrastructure leasing price, the amount of infrastructure to lease, the spectrum leasing price, and the amount of spectrum to lease to maximize their utilities. The best strategies that will be taken by the TSO and NIO under various deployment scenarios are analyzed. Evaluation results show that the proposed green spectrum and infrastructure leasing framework is a promising scheme under which both TSO and NIO can benefit, and their utilities can be maximized in terms of user data throughput and revenue/payment, which provides sufficient incentives for them to cooperate.
AB - In this paper, we propose a green spectrum and infrastructure leasing framework for sharing unused TV spectrum, in which the ownership of the network infrastructure and spectrum are decoupled, and each can be leased as a service on demand. An incumbent TV spectrum owner (TSO) can lease a share of the infrastructure from a network infrastructure owner (NIO) with a pay-per-use model, to provide new services to its end users. On the other hand, a TSO can rent a portion of its unused spectrum to the NIO for revenue such that the NIO can obtain access to the spectrum to serve its customers. This proposed framework achieves green communications through both resource sharing and energy saving. Our paper aims to analyze the interplay between TSO and NIO, and create a win-win situation to provide sufficient incentives for them to cooperate on this green communications. A multistage Stackelberg game is formulated, where TSO and NIO sequentially determine the total bandwidth supply for sharing, the infrastructure leasing price, the amount of infrastructure to lease, the spectrum leasing price, and the amount of spectrum to lease to maximize their utilities. The best strategies that will be taken by the TSO and NIO under various deployment scenarios are analyzed. Evaluation results show that the proposed green spectrum and infrastructure leasing framework is a promising scheme under which both TSO and NIO can benefit, and their utilities can be maximized in terms of user data throughput and revenue/payment, which provides sufficient incentives for them to cooperate.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85029672182&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TVT.2016.2636331
DO - 10.1109/TVT.2016.2636331
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85029672182
SN - 0018-9545
VL - 66
SP - 6511
EP - 6522
JO - IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
JF - IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
IS - 7
M1 - 7776954
ER -